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Abstract 
In the light of the new international requirements on the emergency preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological emergencies, 
the basics of the strategy of protection of the public in event of beyond design basis accident at a nuclear plant have been reviewed. New 
international requirements were issued by the IAEA in 2015 taking into account lessons learned from the accident at the NPP Fukushima 
Daiichi in Japan on 11 March 2011. 
The IAEA pays particular attention to the development of safety infrastructure in Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme. 
In the framework of the national projects of technical cooperation, the IAEA is actively implementing international safety requirements released 
in the IAEA Safety Standards. Following the IAEA safety standards for these States became mandatory. The key issue of the requirements 
is a demand to Member State to have a public protection strategy in place before the commissioning the first NPP. The strategy shall be 
based on the Generic criteria to be used in emergency preparedness and response to protect the people in emergency exposure situation 
- to prevent severe deterministic effects, and 
- to limit the risk of stochastic health effects on the reasonably achievable level. 
The strategy shall include 
1. Classification of facilities and areas according to the degree of potential radiological hazard. 
2. Classification of emergency planning zones around the hazardous facility. 
3. Classification of the status of a facility in event of an emergency. 
The Russian Federation takes an active part in the construction of nuclear power plants in those countries that are just embarking on a 
nuclear power programme, therefore, new international requirements should be considered in the design and construction of the NPPs abroad. 
Those requirements should be also considered in training of national personnel for the implementation of nuclear power programme. 
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e  ents containing the international requirements pertaining to
nsuring emergency preparedness and response to nuclear and
adiological emergencies [1] . This document is to replace
he IAEA Safety Standards No. GS-R-2 issued in 2002 [2] .
ssessment of the Russian system for ensuring protection to
he public in case of severe accident at the NPP in the light of
he GS-R-2 safety requirements was made in [3] . Main safety
equirements as pertains to the strategy of public protection
n the case of nuclear or radiological emergency at the NPP
s the object of use of nuclear energy are addressed in the
resent paper. 
trategy of public protection in the case of nuclear or 
adiological accident 
Twelve international organisations participated together 
ith the IAEA in the development of new international re-
uirements on the ensuring emergency preparedness and re-
ponse in the cases of nuclear or radiological emergencies
1] . Lessons learned from the severe accident at the NPP
ukushima Daiichi, which started in Japan on 11 March 2011
4] , found their reflection in the international requirements on
he public protection strategy. 
In accordance with the ICRP Recommendations (2007)
5] , the international requirements are focused on the gener-
tion and development of the state-level optimized strategy
f public protection in the emergency exposure situations. In
ccordance with [1] it is required that strategies of protection
f humans, the environment and property from risks associ-
ted with radiation accidents were developed, substantiated
nd optimized during the phase of emergency preparedness.
his is required for efficiently undertaking protective and
ther response actions in cases of nuclear or radiological
mergencies (hereinafter referred to in the present paper as
he radiation emergencies). Such strategy is based on the
eneral criteria of protection of humans in the emergency
xposure and includes classification of the following: 
- Facilities, practices and areas according to the degree of
their potential hazard; 
- Emergency planning areas surrounding the hazardous fa-
cilities; 
- Conditions of the hazardous facility in case of accident. 
The basis of the protection strategy is formed by the
eneric criteria of protection of humans in the emergency ex-
osure situations developed by the IAEA to be applied in pre-
aredness and response to radiation emergency [6–8] . These
eneric criteria ensure the following: 
- Prevention of development of severe deterministic effects,
i.e. such health effects of radiation which are fatal or con-
stitute threat to human life or result in the irreparable dam-
age to health though deterioration of the quality of life; 
- Restriction of risk of development of stochastic effects of
radiation to reasonably achievable levels. Criteria intended for assessment of development of severe
eterministic effects are presented in Table 1 . Values of the
riteria are provided in units of the RBE weighted dose in
rgan or tissue T , AD T —the new dosimetric quantity deter-
ined by the IAEA for the purposes of assessment of risks
or development of severe deterministic effects in the situa-
ions of high dose external exposure of high level intake of
adioactive material. For purposes of the evaluation of conse-
uences of intake of radioactive material, the committed for
ertain period of time  after intake the RBE weighted dose
n organ or tissue T , AD ( ) T is used. AD ( ) T is the time in-
egral of the RBE weighted dose rate in the organ or tissue T
ver the time period  due after the intake of radioactive ma-
erial. The unit of RBE weighed dose is gray (Gy) [1,6,9,10] .
hese quantities and units are in accordance with the recom-
endations of the ICRU [9] . It is expected that in case of
xcess of levels in Table 1 the probability of development
f severe deterministic effect will exceed 5% [7,10] which is
egarded as unacceptable [6,10] . 
Values of criteria intended for restriction of risk of devel-
pment of stochastic effects of radiation are accepted to be
qual to the lower boundary of radiation exposure doses for
ersons belonging to the group numbering more than 100,000
eople when it is possible theoretically to detect within such a
roup additional cases of morbidity or mortality from cancer
iseases caused by radiation [8,11] . Exposure situations corre-
pond to the above condition of detectability of the stochastic
ffects if 
 < 100 mSv ; H Fetus < 100 mSv ; H Thyroid < 50 mSv , (1)
here E is the effective dose; H Fetus is the equivalent dose of
xposure of foetus or embryo; H Thyroid is the equivalent dose
f exposure of thyroid gland. 
If exposure of persons belonging to the group with any
umber of people will not exceed the above indicated levels,
t will be theoretically impossible to prove using contempo-
ary scientific methodologies the presence in the group of
ancer morbidity and mortality caused by radiation exposure
n excess the natural background level [12] . 
In accordance with the ICRP [5] , humans appearing in the
mergency exposure situation will be protected if radiation
oses received by the representative person will not exceed
he levels indicated in Table 1 and in ( 1 ) [1,8,9] . At the same
ime human safety will be ensured only when after the acci-
ent the defence in depth of the radiation source and, con-
equently control over the radiation source, will be restored
11,13] . 
In accordance with [1] , it is required for ensuring effi-
ient public protection in event of loss control over the ra-
iation source, the emergency plan of protection of person-
el, public, the environment and property must be developed
nd maintained in active status during the phases of design,
onstruction, operation and decommissioning of the radiation
ource (facility). Receiving of doses in excess of those in-
icated in Table 1 in the event of severe nuclear accident
imilar to the Chernobyl accident may take place within sev-
ral hours. In such conditions, decisions on the implemen-
26 V.A. Kutkov et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 24–29 
Table 1 
Generic criteria for acute radiation exposure doses for preventing severe deterministic effects of radiation. 
RBE weighted dose in organ or tissue of acute external Committed for 30 days after acute intake the RBE 
exposure in less than 10 h weighted dose in organ or tissue 
AD Red marrow , Gy 1 AD ( ) Red marrow , Gy 0.2 for radionuclides with Z ≥ 90 c 
2 for radionuclides with Z ≤ 89 c 
AD Fetus , Gy 0.1 AD ( ) Fetus , Gy d 0.1 
AD Soft tissue , Gy a 25 AD ( ) Thyroid , Gy 2 
AD Skin dermis , Gy b 10 AD ( ) Lung , Gy e 30 
AD ( ) Large intestine , Gy 20 
Notes : 
a Dose received by tissue on the 100 cm 2 area at the depth of 0.5 cm below the body surface as the result of close contact with radioactive source. 
b Dose received on the 100 cm 2 dermis area (skin structure at the depth of 40 mg/cm 2 (or 0.4 mm) below the skin surface as the result of skin contamination 
of close contact with radioactive source. 
c Different generic criteria are applied to radionuclides within these groups in order to account for the significant differences between the threshold values 
of intake for specific radionuclides [7,10] . 
d In this case ´ stands for the period of in utero development of the offspring, which is set to be 9 months. 
e For the purposes of the present generic criteria the term “lung” means the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory tract. 
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 tation of protective measures off-site must be taken within
the first hour after initiation of the accident. Lessons learned
from previous severe beyond design basis accidents on NPPs
demonstrate that first priority decisions on the protection of
public are made in the conditions of complete absence of
data on the amount, character and duration of release of ra-
dioactive material into the atmosphere [4,14] . To take fast
and timely decision in such uncertain conditions, one needs
to have in advance the set of optimized concepts of opera-
tions for different pre-established scenarios of development
of nuclear or radiological emergency taking into account the
properties of source of hazard, people under risk and scale or
severity of emergency. These concepts of operation, generic
criteria and criteria for assessment the event associated with
the facility or area compose the strategy of public protection
in the emergency exposure situation. 
For the purposes of development of efficient strategy of
public protection in the emergency exposure situation, which
may require taking urgent decision in the conditions of limited
information, the IAEA requires [1] that the protection strategy
and emergency shall be developed at preparedness stage and
based on 
- hazard associated with facilities, practices or areas for
graded approach to the development of adequate protec-
tion strategy; 
- inhabited areas surrounding the hazardous facilities for tak-
ing target public protective actions; 
- emergency at hazardous facilities or areas for timely initi-
ation of implementation of the emergency plan and reali-
sation of the protection strategy. 
Classification of facilities, practices or areas 
Depending on the potential hazard, the facilities, practices
or areas are grouped in [1] into five emergency preparedness
categories (EPCs). Stationary facilities are attributed to the
EPC I–III. EPC IV consolidates those activities that could
give rise to a nuclear or radiological emergency that couldead to development of severe deterministic effects and war-
ant urgent protective actions in an unforeseeable location,
hich could not be defined in advance. That category in-
ludes activities, such as transport of radioactive material and
uclear ship out of harbour, or use of mobile industrial radio-
raphy device in remote location [15] , and acts, including the
alicious acts. Hazard category does not include stationary
acilities. That category defines minimum level of emergency
reparedness in any country. EPC V consolidates areas within
mergency planning zones and distances for a facility in EPC
 or EPC II located in the neighbouring country (i.e. across the
order). This category adequately reflects the dangers associ-
ted with transboundary contamination of environment similar
o those, which took place as the result of the accident at the
PP Fukushima Daiichi [4] . 
The basis for quantitative attribution of the facility to a par-
icular hazard category is provided by the value of the index
f danger, ID , of the total inventory of dispersible radioactive
aterials in the facility 
 D = 
∑ 
i 
A i / D 2i , (2)
here A i is the activity of the i th radionuclide in the mixture;
 2i is the D 2 -value reflecting danger of i th radionuclide in
he dispersible form and provided in [10] . 
EPC I corresponds to the maximum level of emergency
reparedness. Emergency preparedness of this level must be
nsured in every country implementing nuclear power pro-
ramme. EPC I consolidates those stationary facilities, such
s nuclear power plants (NPP), for which on-site events (in-
luding very low probability events) are postulated that could
ive rise to severe deterministic health effects off the site,
r for which such events have occurred in similar facili-
ies. The following facilities shall be considered as facility in
PC I [15] : 
- Reactors with thermal power levels greater than
100 MW(th); 
V.A. Kutkov et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 24–29 27 
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p  - Facilities and/or locations containing recently discharged 
irradiated reactor fuel with a total of more than about
1E + 17 Bq of Cs-137; 
- Facilities with inventories of dispersible radioactive mate-
rial sufficient to result in severe deterministic effects off
the site, such as with ID exceeds 10,000. 
EPC II consolidates those stationary facilities, such as
ome types of research reactors, for which on-site events are
ostulated that could give rise to doses to people off the site
hat warrant only urgent protective action in accordance with
nternational standards, or for which such events have oc-
urred in similar facilities. EPC II (as opposed to EPC I) does
ot include facilities for which on-site events are postulated
hat could give rise to severe deterministic health effects off
he site. The following facilities shall be considered as facility
n EPC II [15] : 
- Reactors with power levels greater than 2 MW(th) and less
than or equal to 100 MW(th), such as small power reactors
or big research reactors; 
- Facilities and/or locations containing recently discharged 
irradiated reactor fuel requiring active cooling; 
- Facilities with potential for an uncontrolled criticality
within 0.5 km of the off-site boundary, which might be
accessible by the public; 
- Facilities with inventories of dispersible radioactive mate-
rial sufficient to result in doses warranting urgent protective
action being taken off the site, such as with ID more than
or equal to 100 and less than 10,000. 
EPC III consolidates those stationary facilities, such as in-
ustrial irradiation facilities or small research reactors, etc.,
or which on-site events are postulated that could give rise
o doses that warrant or contamination that warrants urgent
rotective action only on the site, or for which such events
ave occurred in similar facilities. EPC III (as opposed to
PC II) does not include facilities for which events are pos-
ulated that could warrant urgent protective action off the
ite. The following facilities shall be considered as facility in
PC III [15] : 
- Facilities with the potential, if shielding is lost, for caus-
ing direct external kerma-in-air rate at 1 m of more than
100 mGy/h; 
- Facilities with potential for an uncontrolled criticality
more than 0.5 km from the off-site boundary which
might be accessible for the public. 
- Reactors with power levels of less than or equal to
2 MW(th); 
- Facilities with inventories of radioactive material suffi-
cient to result in doses warranting urgent protective ac-
tion being taken only on the site, such as with ID more
than or equal to 0.01 and less than 100. 
Accident at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP in 1986 and at
nits 1, 2, 3 NPP Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 give example
f nuclear emergency at facility in EPC I. Meltdown of fueln spent fuel storage pool at Unit 4 of the NPP Fukushima
aiichi provides example of emergency at facility in
PC II [4] 
Five categories of emergency preparedness form the basis
or graded approach to development of generically optimized
rotection strategies in event of radiation emergency at facility
r territory. 
lassification of emergency planning zones and distances 
round facility 
The most stringent requirements on the composition and
ubject matter of the protection strategy and the emergency
lan of public protection determining the joint actions by the
perator of the facility and the local authorities. The local au-
horities bear primarily responsible for ensuring public pro-
ection in within the established emergency planning zones
nd distances off the site of facility. 
Standards [1] establish the following emergency planning
ones: 
- Precautionary action zone (PAZ); 
- Urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ). 
Standards also establish the following two emergency plan-
ing distances (radii): 
- Extended planning distance (EPD); 
- Ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD). 
The PAZ is the nearby off-site territory around the facil-
ty where the unprotected person could be exposed in excess
he generic criteria in Table 1 during the passage of cloud of
adioactive release and fallout of radionuclides. Precaution-
ry evacuation is the only efficient public protective action to
void severe deterministic effects in those who occupied the
AZ. 
The UPZ is the nearby territory around the facility where
he unprotected person could be exposed in excess the level
f detectability of stochastic effects in ( 1 ) during the pas-
age of cloud of radioactive release and fallout of radionu-
lides, and in excess of generic criteria in Table 1 during
everal hours after deposition of radioactive material on the
round. 
Urgent protective actions, such as evacuation and shelter-
ng, shall be warrant in that zone for restriction of risk of
evelopment of stochastic effects in those who occupied the
PZ. The off-site precautionary protective actions shall be
one in UPZ before release of radioactive material occurs and,
herefore, emergency exposure of the public begins. The pur-
ose of definition of emergency planning zones and distances
s to ensure the initiation of protective and other measures
rior to the beginning of the radioactive release necessitating
ndertaking protective measures beyond the facility site or
oon after the beginning of the radioactive release. Here, im-
lementation of protective measures within the PAZ is the first
riority while undertaking urgent protective measures within
28 V.A. Kutkov et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 24–29 
Table 2 
Suggested sizes of emergency planning zones and distances. 
Emergency planning areas and distances Suggested maximal size 
More or equal to 1000 MW(th) From 100 to 1000 MW(th) 
Precautionary action zone (PAZ), km 3–5 
Urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), km 15–30 
Extended planning distance (EPD), km 100 50 
Ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD), km 300 100 
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uthe UPZ must be organized in such a way, as to prevent hin-
dering implementation of protective measures within the PAZ.
In accordance with requirements in [1] , the decision regard-
ing activation of protective measures in UPZ and PAZ shall
be based on pre-defined Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
The EAL is a specific, predetermined, observable criterion
used to detect, recognize and determine the emergency class,
and prognoses further development of emergency situation by
means of assessment the initial event at facility before the re-
lease occurred. 
An extended planning distance (EPD) from the facility,
for facilities in EPC I or II, is the area beyond the UPZ, for
which arrangements shall be made to conduct radiation moni-
toring and assess the radiological situation off the site in order
to locate hotspots with dose rates warranting (a) evacuation
within a days following a release or (b) relocation within a
weeks to a month following a release [16] . The Operational
Intervention Levels (OIL) provide the base for assessment
of results of radiation monitoring. Those operational triggers
shall be calculated during the preparedness phase based on
the above-defined generic criteria in ( 1 ). In accordance with
[1] the structure and values of the OILs must be determined
during the phase of NPP design project implementation. Sce-
narios and examples of calculation of OILs are provided in
[6,16,17] . 
An ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD)
from the facility, for facilities in EPC I or II, is the area be-
yond the extended planning distance for which arrangements
shall be made to take response actions (a) for protecting the
food chain and water supply as well as for protecting com-
modities other than food from contamination following a sig-
nificant release and (b) for protecting the public from the
ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the use
of commodities other than food with possible contamination
following a significant release [16] . 
Sizes of emergency planning areas and distances recom-
mended by the IAEA calculation of which was performed
for the conditions of severe beyond-design basis accident for
NPP equipped with 3000 MW(th) reactor unit in the assump-
tion of release in atmosphere of 10% of accumulated fission
products within 10 h after the reactor emergency shutdown are
presented in Ref. [16] . Such accident corresponds to Level 6
on the INES scale [18] . Results of calculations are presented
in Table 2. 
In accordance with [1] sizes of emergency planning zones
and distances must be determined during the phase of de-
signing and siting the NPP. The special attention should beut on situation when territory of neighbouring state could
e covered by the extension of the emergency planning zones
nd distances of the new NPP. 
lassification of emergencies at facility 
Potential nuclear and radiation emergencies at facilities IN
PC I, II and III are grouped in [1] into four categories due
o damage inflicted by the initiating event to their defence in
epth as follows: 
- General emergency at facility in EPC I or EPC II for an
emergency associated with complete degradation of the de-
fence in depth and significant release of radioactive mate-
rial, or with irradiation, or with significant risk of such
which warrants implementation of precautionary or urgent
protective actions beyond the facility site; 
- Site area emergency at facility in EPC I or EPC II associ-
ated with significant damage of the defence in depth and
decrease of levels of protection of people at the site; 
- Facility emergency at facility in EPC I, EPC II or EPC
III associated with significant damage of the defence in
depth and decrease of levels of protection of people at the
facility; 
- Alert at the facility in EPC I, EPC II or EPC III associated
with abnormal conditions at the facility and unforeseen
damage of the defence in depth. 
In event of nuclear emergency, the emergency exposure
f the public off the site could take place mostly due to re-
ease of radioactive material from the facility. Release of ra-
ioactive material is the objective quantitative characteristic
f the nuclear emergency which, depending on the foreseen
cale may warrant implementation of precautionary, urgent or
ther protective actions beyond the site area. In accordance
ith [1,6,15] in event of emergency, the preliminary classifi-
ation of facility status and probable off-site hazard must be
one by the facility operator within 15 min. The final decla-
ation of emergency should be completed within 60 min after
ccident. In case of accident at the NPP Fukushima Daiichi
PP, operator declared the general emergency 70 min after
he significant damage of the power plant by the tsunami took
lace [4] . In accordance with [1] , the EALs, which would al-
ow assessing the emergency development and forecasting the
haracter and the scale of the release of radioactive material
n atmosphere based on facility status parameters, shall be
sed in the classification of emergency at the facility. 
V.A. Kutkov et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 24–29 29 
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[  In accordance with [1] , the structure and values of EALs
hall be determined during the phase of design of the NPP.
cenarios and examples of EALs are provided in [6] . 
onclusions 
As it was demonstrated in [3] , the system for emergency
reparedness and response which existed in the Russian Fed-
ration did not satisfy the international requirements stipulated
n [2] . This system did not undergo significant modifications
uring recent years and it can be stated with enough confi-
ence that this system does not satisfy as well the interna-
ional requirements stipulated in [1] . 
In accordance with the Statute of the IAEA, the IAEA reg-
lations are not mandatory for the Agency’s Member States.
evertheless, following these regulations is mandatory for
he states to which the IAEA provides assistance within the
ramework of technical cooperation programs. The IAEA pays
pecial attention to the development of the safety infrastruc-
ure by the Member States initiating the development of their
uclear power programmes. Within the framework of na-
ional technical cooperation projects, the IAEA actively im-
arts the international standards related to safety, and issued in
he IAEA Safety Standards Series of publications. Following
he IAEA standards is mandatory for the sates in question.
mergency preparedness and emergency response are the key
lements in the achieving the objectives of general safety of
uclear power programmes. Development and maintaining of
uch programmes require joint efforts of everybody partici-
ating in the design, construction and operation of the NPP
nd bearing responsibility for the safety of the population liv-
ng near the power plant. International standards pertaining to
mergency preparedness and response to nuclear and radio-
ogical emergencies create solid basis for implementation of
uch joint efforts. In accordance with these standards, the fol-
owing must be determined during the phase of NPP design
nd put into effect prior to the delivery of fresh nuclear fuel
o the NPP for ensuring the development of efficient public
rotection strategies beyond the site area: 
- Structure and sizes of emergency planning areas and dis-
tances; 
- Structure and values of the OILs; 
- Structure and values of the EALs. 
Russian Federation actively adheres to the position accord-
ng to which nuclear power plants are constructed specificallyn those countries which are at the beginning of initiation of
heir nuclear power programmes and, therefore, the new in-
ernational standards must be taken into consideration in the
esigning of NPPs to be constructed abroad Russia. 
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